Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced a terrible humanitarian crisis in eastern Europe. It also is worsening conditions for other countries, many of them thousands of miles away.
Together, Russia and Ukraine account for almost 30 per cent of wheat exports, nearly 20 per cent of corn exports and close to 80 per cent of sunflower seed products, including oils. The war has largely shut off grain exports from Ukraine, cut seeding of this year’s crop, and is driving up world prices for grain and oilseeds. The war has also increased energy and fertilizer prices.
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I research famines and extreme food security crises and am part of a group of independent experts who review the data, analysis and conclusions whenever a national assessment indicates that a famine may be occurring or about to occur.
The people of Ukraine deserve all of the attention and help that they are receiving. But I believe the global community must not lose sight of humanitarian suffering occurring elsewhere now, including many countries far from the spotlight.
The war in Ukraine has pushed prices to near all-time highs. As of April 8, the average cost of staple food grains had jumped by more than 17 per cent from February levels. And with the war likely to continue, a global supply shortfall could lead nations to adopt measures such as export bans that further distort food markets.
The global grain market is very concentrated. More than 85 per cent of global wheat exports come from just seven sources: the EU, U.S., Canada, Russia, Australia, Ukraine and Argentina. The same share of corn exports comes from just four countries: the U.S., Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine.
Many nations across the Middle East and North Africa are major wheat importers and buy much of their supply from Russia and Ukraine — they had been providing 90 per cent of Somalia’s wheat imports, 80 per cent of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s, and about 40 per cent each of Yemen’s and Ethiopia’s.
Losing Ukrainian and Russian exports means higher grain prices and much longer shipping distances from alternative suppliers such as Australia, the U.S., Canada and Argentina — at a time when high energy prices are raising shipping costs. And since global grain markets are denominated in U.S. dollars, the dollar’s current strength makes grain even more expensive for countries with weaker currencies.
For nations already at risk of famine, these effects could be disastrous.
Prior to the war, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that 161 million people in 42 countries were in extreme food insecurity, meaning they needed urgent food assistance. Over a half-million people faced famine levels of food deprivation — by far the most extreme levels of hunger since at least the early 2000s. The most badly affected countries include Yemen, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Kenya.
The causes of these crises vary.
Violent conflict is a common factor across most of them. Some countries are still struggling to recover from the economic and health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. A devastating drought is also affecting the Horn of Africa, with rains from March through May now forecast to be well below average. This would constitute the fourth failed or below-average rainy season in a row for areas of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.
Even before the Ukraine invasion, this combination of factors had already led to the highest numbers on record of people needing food and other humanitarian assistance for their survival in the East African Region. Rural labour markets and the price of livestock — the two things that the poorest have to sell — have collapsed due to the drought, precisely as global food prices have spiked. A dramatic decline in purchasing power was a major driver of the 2011 famine in Somalia, and the same circumstances are rapidly taking shape now.
For countries in crisis, the UN World Food Program is the primary global provider of food for at-risk populations. In 2021, it procured nearly half of its grain from Ukraine.
Much of its food aid is delivered as direct cash transfers rather than in-kind supplies. But whatever form it takes, the cost of that aid has increased substantially with rising food, fuel and shipping prices. World Food Program officials estimate that the cost of its operations has increased by 44 per cent since the start of the war in Ukraine, and the agency now faces a 50 per cent funding gap.
The crisis in Ukraine has also spotlighted a growing gap between funding and needs, especially in some of the world’s poorest countries.
For example, the UN issued a flash appeal for humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in early March 2022. By April 15 it was 65 per cent funded. Countries at risk of famine, whose appeals have been out longer, have received much less funding. On April 15, Afghanistan’s appeal was 13.5 per cent funded; South Sudan, 8.2 per cent; and Somalia only 4.4 per cent. Overall funding for global humanitarian needs stood at 6.5 per cent of requested levels.
When I worked as the deputy regional director for CARE International in East Africa, I often worried about how a humanitarian crisis in one country might have spillover effects in others. There could be influxes of refugees who need assistance, or humanitarian staff might have to be shifted to support the response to the new crisis.
In those days, some crises triggered by drought could affect several countries in the region at once. But the ripple effects from the war in Ukraine could lead to the worsening of humanitarian crises around the world.
Daniel Maxwell is a professor of food security at the Friedman School of Nutrition and The Fletcher School at Tufts University, a research institution located near Boston.
